Standards development within the Information Technology sector is harmonized with international standards development. Through the CSA Technical Committee on Information Technology (TCIT), Canadians serve as the SCC Mirror Committee (SMC) on ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 on Information Technology (ISO/IEC JTC1) for the Standards Council of Canada (SCC), the ISO member body for Canada and sponsor of the Canadian National Committee of the IEC. Also, as a member of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Canada participates in the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (ITU-T).
For brevity, this Standard will be referred to as CSA ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE throughout.
This Standard supersedes CSA ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:20 (adopted ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2013). At the time of publication, ISO/IEC/IEEE 8802-1AE:2020 is available from ISO and IEC in English only. CSA Group will publish the French version when it becomes available from ISO and IEC.
This Standard has been formally approved, without modification, by the Technical Committee and has been developed in compliance with Standards Council of Canada requirements for National Standards of Canada. It has been published as a National Standard of Canada by CSA Group.
The scope of this standard is to specify provision of connectionless user data confidentiality, frame data integrity, and data origin authenticity by media access independent protocols and entities that operate transparently to MAC Clients.
NOTE—The MAC Clients are as specified in IEEE Std 802®, IEEE Std 802.1Q™, and IEEE Std 802.1X.2
To this end, it
a) Specifies the requirements to be satisfied by equipment claiming conformance to this standard.
b) Specifies the requirements for MACsec in terms of provision of the MAC Service and the preservation of the semantics and parameters of service requests and indications.
c) Describes the threats, both intentional and accidental, to correct provision of the service.
d) Specifies security services that prevent, or restrict, the effect of attacks that exploit these threats.
e) Examines the potential impact of both the threats and the use of MACsec on the Quality of Service (QoS), specifying constraints on the design and operation of MAC Security entities and protocols.
f) Models support of the secure MAC Service in terms of the operation of media access control method independent MAC Security Entities (SecYs) within the MAC Sublayer.
g) Specifies the format of the MACsec Protocol Data Unit (MPDUs) used to provide secure service.
h) Identifies the functions to be performed by each SecY, and provides an architectural model of its internal operation in terms of Processes and Entities that provide those functions.
i) Specifies each SecY’s use of an associated and collocated Port Access Entity (PAE, IEEE Std 802.1X) to discover and authenticate MACsec protocol peers and its use of that PAE’s Key Agreement Entity (KaY) to agree and update cryptographic keys.
j) Specifies performance requirements and recommends default values and applicable ranges for the operational parameters of a SecY.
k) Specifies how SecYs are incorporated within the architecture of end stations, bridges, and two-port Ethernet Data Encryption devices (EDEs).
l) Establishes the requirements for management of MAC Security, identifying the managed objects and defining the management operations for SecYs.
m) Specifies the Management Information Base (MIB) module for managing the operation of MAC Security in TCP/IP networks.
n) Specifies requirements, criteria, and choices of Cipher Suites for use with this standard.